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PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL. By John M. MacDonald. Springfield,
Illinois: Charles C. Thomas. 1958. Pp. 227. $5.50.
Psychiatry is in an unenviable position because of the stereotype, too
often a caricature, which has been created in the public mind by those
who exploit the profession for purposes of public entertainment. The
extreme claims made 'on its behalf by some of its less restrained practitioners has brought down upon it some justified ridicule, or at least
disbelief. Furthermore, the device of judicial notice, because of its conservative nature and because of the unsettled status of psychiatry as a
science, has understandably been withheld when it has been advocated
that psychiatry be given freer play in the courtroom. This is a battlefield with no well-ordered line of battle, but one full of disordered ranks
of participants of varied stature: jurists, clergymen, attorneys, psychiatrists,
laymen who have read Karen Horney and Theodore Reik, and the do-ityourself crowd.
It is a pleasant surprise, therefore, to run across a book written by a
psychiatrist who declines to be a participant in the combat and who
confines himself to the modest but meaningful pursuit of examining how
the psychiatrist can, and should, work within the framework of the law
as it stands. The book thus takes on a practical value not only for the
practitioners involved but also for attorneys, judges, police and prosecution
staffs. Mr. MacDonald is not crusading for a particular side or viewpoint. He is interested in justice and how his profession can best help
to obtain it. Interested parties are free to use the findings he has accumulated through his experience as a psychiatrist working in the criminal
courts.
A sample of chapter headings indicates the scope of the work: The
Simulation of Insanity; Narcoanalysis and Criminal Law; Amnesia; Epilepsy and the Electroencephalogram; Alcoholism and the Law; The Sex
Offender; The Juvenile Delinquent; Psychological Tests; The Psychiatrist in the Witness Stand; and Treatment and Punishment. Some of the
chapters are more detailed than others; this appears a little disappointing
until one realizes that Professor MacDonald limits his observations to his
own experiences rather than taking a textbook approach to his subject.
As a responsible scientist, the author makes plain the limitations of
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the processes and devices which the men of his profession employ, such
as narcoanalysis and psychological tests. Furthermore, he shows an awareness of the rights of the criminally accused consistently manifested whenever these rights are involved in one of the processes of examination.
There. are no fireworks on the subject of criminal responsibility. As
a professional man, he advocates some modification of the "right-wrong"
M'Naghten test, but, like many of his colleagues, he sees the pitfalls in
the ambiguities of the "product" rule announced in Durham v. United
States. 1 One authoritative commentator said of Durham: "The publications
cited [in the opinion] contain serious errors. . . . Judge Bazelon's final
conclusion, is unfortunately based on the psychiatric vagaries found in
some of these publications."2 In regard to the "irresistible impulse" test,
MacDonald issues a ·wry warning: "One should be careful to distinguish
between an irresistible impulse and an impulse that was simply not
resisted." He indicates a preference for the Scottish doctrine of diminished
responsibility, which has been stated as follows:
"Formerly there were only two classes of prisoner, those who were
completely responsible, and those who were completely irresponsible.
Our law has now come to recognize in murder cases a third class,
those who, while they may not merit the description of being insane,
are nevertheless in such a condition as to reduce the quality of their
· act from murder to culpable homicide . . . there must be aberration
or weakness of mind; there must be some form of mental unsoundness; there must be a state of mind bordering on, though not amounting to, insanity; there must be a mind so affected that responsibility is
diminished from full responsibility to partial responsibility; the
prisoner in question must be only partially responsible for his
actions." 3
The author's attitude is one of common sense. Although substan_tial
insight into man's motives has developed in recent times, how can these
motives ever be fully known and comprehended? Thus the jury, with
its intuitive process, still has a r.ole to play, especially because psychiatry
and the law have differing ends. Justice Arnold said in Holloway v.
United States:
"Legal tests of criminal insanity are not and cannot be the result
of scientific analysis or objective judgment.... They must be based on
the instinctive sense of justice of ordinary men. A complete reconciliation between the medical tests of criminal responsibility and the
moral tests of criminal responsibility is impossible. The purposes are
different; the assumptions behind the two standards are different.''4
However, the fact of admission of scientific evidence does not guarantee

(D.C. Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 862.
Wertham, "Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law," 22 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 336 at 336
Q%~.
'
3 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment Report 392 (1953).
4 (D.C. Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 665 at 666-667.
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that it will be accepted by the jury. One need only recall Berry v. Chaplin, 5
a famous case dealing with a much more settled field of science, where
the jury rejected the evidence of blood tests to disprove paternity. As for
psychiatric evidence, the case of Ross v. State,6 decided in 1949, points
out a similar hazard. The case was that of a murder trial which involved
a plea of insanity at the time the murder of four people was committed
by a San Antonio physician. A team of experts in psychiatry and mental
disease testified that Ross, the doctor, was insane. No experts testified that
he was sane, nor did the state offer any expert testimony, but it relied
upon the testimony of peace officers involved in the arrest and upon
character witnesses who knew the doctor. The trial jury had to decide
whether Ross was so mentally deranged at the time of the killings as to
make him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in his
action, or whether he committed the crime under an irresistible impulse,
which is lack of control rather than of understanding. It was reported:
"Despite the unanimous medical testimony that Dr. Ross was insane
and incapable of knowing right from wrong, the jury required only
fifteen minutes of deliberation to reach their verdict, which was guilty
with the penalty of death." 7 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the conviction of Ross. However, on a subsequent separate trial,
Dr. Ross was found insane.8
Admittedly, psychiatry has yet to attain the position of other sciences
in terms of general acceptability, but the subsequent finding of insanity in
the Ross case as contrasted with the fifteen-minute deliberation of the jury
on all the evidence, including the expert psychiatric testimony, reveals
that the jury is essentially a body of laymen with many deficiencies or
misconceptions in their knowledge of the sciences.
However, the problem of adjustment between psychiatry and the
law need not be an overly complicated one. First of all, the plain facts
must be faced: we have learned a great deal about man's mind and his
motivations since the M'Naghten case of over a century ago. This knowledge, or that part of it which is generally accepted, ought to be put to
use in the process of securing justice for society and the individual. As
long as the limits of psychiatry remain undefined and there is disagreement over the validity of known discoveries and developments, the law
cannot commit itself to any broad statements of acceptance. It is evident
that no formula comparable to that of the radar speedmeter is going to
emerge in this field. Judges realize this, but are apt to err in the other
direction, that is, to retard recognition of types of testimony which
could be of use.
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) 169 P. (2d) 442.
(Tex. Crim. App. 1948) 220 S.W. (2d) 137.
7 McCormick, "Science, Experts, and the Courts," 29 TEJC. L. R.Ev. 611 at 621 (1951).
S!bid.
5
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What can be done is to work from the bottom up; in other words,
to adjust the rules of evidence so as to enable the psychiatrist to testify
in terms more relevant to our time and our new knowledge, and to give
some legislative sanction to a broadening of judicial discretion, particularly in instructions to the jury. It is to the credit of some courts that this
has already been done in practice, but more uniformity and recognition
is needed. In the meantime, the criminal law must punish the evildoer,
treat and correct those who are partially responsible, and provide for the
proper care of the irresponsible. Mr. MacDonald's book will help in
these tasks.
Raymond L. Carol,
Associate Professor of Political Science,
St. John's University Graduate School

